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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MCDOWELL v. STATE: ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE, FOR A
SEARCH OF A CONTAINER TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, A
POLICE OFFICER MUST ARTICULATE A REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT THE CONTAINER HOLDS A WEAPON
AND WHY A TERRY-TYPE PAT-DOWN OF THE
CONTAINER WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THERE ARE WEAPONS IN THE CONTAINER.
By: Matthew Powell

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a police officer
conducting a search of a container must articulate reasonable
suspicion that the container holds a weapon. McDowell v. State, 407
Md. 327, 965 A.2d 877 (2009). Moreover, the court held that the
police officer must state why a Terry-type pat-down of the container
would be insufficient to confirm or dispel the suspicion. ld. at 330,
965 A.2d at 879. If the police officer does not meet the two
requirements, the search violates the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 332, 965 A.2d at 880.
Trooper Gussoni ("Gussoni") stopped a vehicle around midnight
after observing the vehicle weave between lanes. Ernest McDowell
("McDowell"), the owner of the vehicle, sat in the passenger seat.
Gussoni observed that both McDowell and the driver seemed nervous
and "appeared to be out of it." While checking the status of the
driver's license and vehicle registration, Gussoni saw McDowell reach
underneath his seat. Gussoni approached the vehicle and saw
McDowell reach toward a gym bag large enough to hold a weapon.
Gussoni ordered McDowell to exit the vehicle and bring the gym bag
with him. Once McDowell exited the vehicle, Gussoni ordered
McDowell to open the gym bag, which contained a plastic bag holding
a white powdery substance. Gussoni confiscated the gym bag and
arrested McDowell. A further search conducted at the police station
uncovered 55.5 grams of heroin in the gym bag.
Subsequent to his arrest, McDowell was charged in the Circuit
Court for Queen Anne's County with several drug-related offenses.
McDowell moved to suppress the evidence seized from the gym bag.
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After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress based
on its finding that Gussoni's search of the gym bag was permissible.
On an agreed statement of facts, the court found McDowell guilty of
importing a controlled dangerous substance into the state and
sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. McDowell timely noted
an appeal on the ground that Gussoni did not have a reasonable
articulable suspicion to believe that McDowell was armed and
dangerous. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
circuit court's decision, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
McDowell's petition for a writ of certiorari.
In reviewing the permissibility of Gussoni's search, the court relied
on Terry v. Ohio and its progeny. McDowell, 407 Md. at 332, 965
A.2d at 880 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Terry
established a police officer's limited right to stop and frisk a person for
weapons when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is occurring and that the person engaged in such activity may
be armed and dangerous. !d. at 332-35, 965 A.2d at 880-81 (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-29). As noted in Terry, however, a stop and
frisk is limited to a "pat-down of the suspect['s] outer clothing" for the
limited purpose of determining whether the suspect is armed. !d. at
334-35, 965 A.2d at 881 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Moreover, the
Terry court noted that a police officer must have a reasonable
suspicion based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
the intrusion." !d. at 334, 965 A.2d at 881 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S at
21).
The court further noted that, in Michigan v. Long, the Supreme
Court extended the Terry doctrine to the interior of vehicles to address
the especially dangerous situations that can arise between suspects and
police officers during vehicular stops. !d. at 335-36, 965 A.2d at 88182 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)). The
Supreme Court reasoned that a Terry-like protective search for
weapons in the interior of a vehicle without probable cause, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. !d. at 336, 965 A.2d at 882 (citing
Long, 463 U.S. at 1049). Thus, if the police officer discovers
incriminating evidence during the course of a Terry stop, that evidence
is admissible against the suspect so long as the officer complies with
the dictates of Terry. McDowell, 407 Md. at 336, 965 A.2d at 882
(citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1050).
Although McDowell conceded that the traffic stop was lawful and
that Gussoni was authorized to order him out of the vehicle,
McDowell claimed that Gussoni did not have a reasonable articulable
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suspicion that McDowell was armed or had weapons in his bag. Jd. at
336-37, 965 A.2d at 882. Furthermore, McDowell argued that
Gussoni's actions were based solely on his nervous appearance, which
was not sufficient to suggest criminal activity. ld. (citing Ferris v.
State, 355 Md. 356, 389, 735 A.2d 491, 509 (1999)).
In determining whether Gussoni possessed a reasonable suspicion
that the bag contained a weapon, the court applied a "totality of the
circumstances" standard. Id. at 337, 965 A.2d at 882 (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). The court concluded that
Gussoni was potentially facing two armed men, alone, without
immediate backup. Jd. at 337-38, 965 A.2d at 883. In light of the
situation, and the bag being large enough to contain a weapon, the
court held that Gussoni was justified in examining the bag. Id. at 338,
965 A.2d at 883 (citing Matoumba v. State, 162 Md. App. 39, 873
A.2d 386 (2005)).
Next, the court determined whether Gussoni was justified in
demanding that McDowell open the bag without first articulating why
a pat-down of the bag would have been insufficient in discovering the
presence of a weapon. McDowell, 407 Md. at 338, 965 A.2d at 883.
Acknowledging that this was an issue of first impression yet to be
addressed by the Supreme Court, the court considered authority from
the federal circuits. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a police officer conducting a Terry stop had no reason to
open a briefcase that was soft and thin enough that, by feeling it, any
weapon could have been detected. Jd. at 339, 965 A.2d at 883-84
(quoting United States v. Vaughn, 718 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit, in a situation similar to that presented
in McDowell and Vaughn, held that a "pat-down was not a necessary
precursor under Terry before opening and searching a pouch" found in
a properly stopped vehicle. !d. at 339, 965 A.2d at 884 (citing United
States v. Shrank/en, 315 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2003)).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not find the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning persuasive. Id. at 340, 965 A.2d at 884. Rather, the court
found that the Eighth Circuit speculated instead of ruling on the
evidence presented. ld. The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
rationale, however, noting that Terry only permitted measures
necessary to determine whether the person was armed. McDowell,
407 Md. at 340, 965 A.2d at 884. These measures must be limited in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover weapons that
could threaten the police officer. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
The court refused to speculate as to whether a pat-down of the bag
would have been adequate in this situation. Id. at 341-42, 965 A.2d at
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885. Thus, the court held that Gussoni was not justified in requiring
McDowell to open the bag without articulating why a Terry-like patdown of the exterior of the bag would have been insufficient to
determine whether the bag contained a weapon. !d. Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court should have granted McDowell's motion
to suppress. !d. at 342, 965 A.2d at 885.
In McDowell v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland extended
the dictates of Terry to containers. In doing so, the court determined
that, to search a container during a Terry stop, police officers must
state a reasonable and articulable basis for why a pat-down of the
container would be insufficient to confirm or dispel the suspicion that
the container held a weapon. As a result, McDowell requires police
officers, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to be particularly attentive
to the factual circumstances surrounding a Terry stop and any
subsequent container searches. If a police officer obtains evidence
from a container without meeting the requirements set forth in
McDowell, any seized evidence will likely be suppressed as a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.

